Max Seeger Which-Object Misidentification Max Seeger — draft as of November ; comments welcome James Pryor distinguishes two varieties of error through misidentification, de re misidentification and which-object misidentification, and two corresponding varieties of immunity to error through misidentification. This paper examines the relation between de re and which-object misidentification. To resolve the tension, Pryor should construe which- object misidentification more broadly, as encompassing de re misidentification. For instance, if I believe that I am seeing a canary, based on my visual impression as of a canary in front of me, I may be wrong in many respects, but I cannot be wrong about it being me who is or seems to be seeing a canary cf.
It is the linguistic job of singular terms to pick out the objects that we think or talk about. But what about singular terms that seem to fail to designate anything, because the objects they refer to don't exist? We can employ these terms in meaningful thought and talk, which suggests that they are succeeding in fulfilling their representational task.
A team of leading experts presents new essays on the much-debated problem of empty reference and thought. In the s and s Keith Donnellan, David Kaplan, Saul Kripke and Hilary Putnam initiated a revolution in the then standard conception of reference--a concept at the core of philosophical inquiry.
The repercussions of the revolution, particularly felt in metaphysics and epistemology, were soon refined by other influential writers such as Tyler Burge, Gareth Evans, and John Perry. They argued that some linguistic and mental representations have contents individuated by what they are about--by ordinary referents of expressions such as proper names, indexicals, definite descriptions and common nouns, i.
The view was at odds with a central philosophical presumption at that time: A turning-point in the debate about how linguistic and mental representation reach external contents concerned the nature of empty mental and linguistic representations, framed by means of the very same expressions crucially invoked in the Donnellan-Kaplan-Kripke-Putnam arguments.
The papers in this volume address different aspects of reference and thought about the apparently non-existent.Unsorted references I hope to clean these up soon. Adam Leite, "How to take skepticism seriously," Philosophical Studies () Adam Leite, "Immediate warrant.
Memory seems to support judgments about the past in two very different ways. One of them is by preserving a judgment that was formed in the past over time.
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It is the first collection of essays devoted exclusively to the topic and will be essential reading for anyone interested in philosophical work on the self, first-person thought or indexical thought more generally. This shopping feature will continue to load items.
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